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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Deportable immigrants are presumptively exempt from 
the discretionary imposition of supervised release under 
Section 5D1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines.  Appellant 
Francisco Azcona-Polanco, a deportable immigrant, argues 
that the District Court committed a procedural sentencing 
error by sentencing him to a term of supervised release 
without an adequate explanation.  We write to clarify the 
procedural obligations of a district court under Section 
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5D1.1(c).  Azcona-Polanco also challenges his sentence of 
imprisonment as substantively unreasonable.  On both claims, 
we will affirm.   
 
I 
 
 Azcona-Polanco, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, 
was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent 
resident in 1972.  In 1994, he was ordered removed based 
upon a conviction for heroin distribution, but never left the 
country.  In 1997, Azcona-Polanco was convicted of 
conspiracy to violate federal narcotics laws and sentenced to 
168 months’ incarceration.  He was deported at the expiration 
of his federal sentence in 2009, but thereafter reentered the 
United States illegally and assumed an alias, having 
purchased a citizen’s birth certificate and Social Security 
card. 
 
 Azcona-Polanco was arrested and later pled guilty to 
illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2).  His 
sentencing range was 41 to 51 months.  The Guideline range 
for a term of supervised release was 1 to 3 years, U.S.S.G. 
§ 5D1.2(a)(2), with a statutory maximum of 3 years, 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2).1  Azcona-Polanco, however, was 
presumptively exempt from supervised release under Section 
5D1.1(c) because he is a deportable immigrant.  U.S.S.G. 
§ 5D1.1(c).  At least two documents submitted to the District 
                                              
 1  All references to the Sentencing Guidelines refer to 
the 2015 edition of the Guidelines Manual.  See U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.11(a) (“The court shall use the Guidelines Manual in 
effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced.”). 
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Court noted this presumption: the Presentence Investigation 
Report and Azcona-Polanco’s sentencing memorandum.   
 
 The District Court sentenced Azcona-Polanco to 41 
months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release.  As to 
the term of supervised release, the Court stated, “Now clearly 
I understand that he’s going to be deported . . . , and if he 
follows the law and does not reenter the United States, he 
obviously will never have to report on a regular basis to 
Probation.  Nevertheless I’m imposing this condition in case 
he does illegally reenter the United States he must report in 
person to Probation.”  App. 71.  The District Court also stated 
generally that “[t]here is obviously a need for specific 
deterrence because he keeps coming back when he’s been 
told not to come back.”  App. 70.  Azcona-Polanco did not 
object to the imposition of supervised release.  
 
II 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742.   
 
 We review Azcona-Polanco’s claim that the District 
Court committed a procedural sentencing error for “plain 
error” because he failed to object in the District Court.  
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  The plain error test requires (1) an 
error; (2) that is “clear or obvious” and (3) “affected the 
defendant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case 
means he or she must ‘show a reasonable probability that, but 
for the error,’ the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
1338, 1343 (2016) (quoting United States v. Dominguez 
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Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76, 82 (2004)).  If these conditions are 
met, we will exercise our discretion to correct the error if it 
“seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 
507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)).  We review Azcona-Polanco’s 
claim that his sentence of imprisonment is substantively 
unreasonable for abuse of discretion.  Gall v. United States, 
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).   
 
III 
 
A 
 
 At sentencing, a district court conducts a familiar, 
three-step procedure.  First, it calculates the applicable 
Guideline range.  Second, the court rules on any motions for 
departure.  Third, after considering the parties’ arguments and 
the Section 3553(a) factors, it determines the appropriate 
sentence, which may vary from the Guideline range.  United 
States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
 A district court must impose a term of supervised 
release where required by statute or, as here, may do so in the 
exercise of its discretion.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(a); see also 
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1, cmt. n.1.  When 
determining whether to impose a discretionary term of 
supervised release, it considers certain Section 3553(a) 
factors.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), 
(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and 
(a)(7)); see also U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1, cmt. n.3.   
 
 Deportable immigrants are presumptively exempt from 
the discretionary imposition of supervised release per a 2011 
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amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines.  U.S.S.G. Supp. 
App. C, Amend. 756.  This amendment created Section 
5D1.1(c), which provides: “The court ordinarily should not 
impose a term of supervised release in a case in which 
supervised release is not required by statute and the defendant 
is a deportable alien who likely will be deported after 
imprisonment.”  U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c).   
 
 The commentary to Section 5D1.1(c) reiterates the 
presumption against supervised release, explains its rationale, 
and provides circumstances in which supervised release may 
be warranted: 
 
In a case in which the defendant is 
a deportable alien specified in 
subsection (c) and supervised 
release is not required by statute, 
the court ordinarily should not 
impose a term of supervised 
release. Unless such a defendant 
legally returns to the United 
States, supervised release is 
unnecessary. If such a defendant 
illegally returns to the United 
States, the need to afford adequate 
deterrence and protect the public 
ordinarily is adequately served by 
a new prosecution. The court 
should, however, consider 
imposing a term of supervised 
release on such a defendant if the 
court determines it would provide 
an added measure of deterrence 
 7 
 
and protection based on the facts 
and circumstances of a particular 
case. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c), cmt. n.5.  
  
 In adopting Section 5D1.1(c), the Sentencing 
Commission noted that “recent changes in our immigration 
law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad 
class of noncitizen offenders.”  U.S.S.G. Supp. App. C, 
Amend. 756, Reason for Amendment (quoting Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010)).  While supervised 
release is not “automatically extinguished by deportation,” 
United States v. Williams, 369 F.3d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 2004), 
the Sentencing Commission concluded that ordinarily 
“imposing supervised release on a removable defendant is 
both unnecessary and undesirable.”  United States v. 
Zamudio, 718 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing U.S.S.G. 
Supp. App. C, Amend. 756).2   
 
B 
 
 This Court reviews a district court’s sentence via a 
two-step process.  We begin by determining whether a district 
court committed a “procedural error, such as failing to 
calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, 
treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the 
§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly 
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen 
                                              
 2  The Seventh Circuit also noted that the imposition of 
supervised release on deportable immigrants may “burden 
probation officers.”  Zamudio, 718 F.3d at 991. 
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sentence.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).  If we 
identify a procedural error, we will generally remand for 
resentencing without going further.  United States v. Mateo-
Medina, 845 F.3d 546, 550 (3d Cir. 2017).  If the district 
court’s sentence is procedurally sound, we review it for 
substantive reasonableness.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.   
 
 Azcona-Polanco asserts a specific type of procedural 
error—that the District Court “fail[ed] to adequately explain 
the chosen sentence.”  Id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).  A 
district court is required to “state in open court the reasons for 
its imposition of the particular sentence.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(c).  In explaining a sentence, a “judge should set forth 
enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered 
the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising 
his own legal decisionmaking authority.”  Rita v. United 
States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).  Although there is no 
“uniform threshold,” this explanation must be “sufficient for 
us to see that the particular circumstances of the case have 
been given meaningful consideration within the parameters of 
§ 3553(a).”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567 (citation omitted). 
 
 The requirement that a district court provide an 
adequate explanation applies to supervised release.  See 
United States v. Joline, 662 F.3d 657, 659-60 (3d Cir. 2011).  
For example, we have repeatedly held that a district court 
must explain its reasons for imposing special conditions of 
supervised release.  United States v. Paladino, 769 F.3d 197, 
203 n.6 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Murray, 692 F.3d 
273, 283 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 
191, 200 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 
172, 184 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 
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371 (3d Cir. 1999); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); U.S.S.G. 
§ 5D1.3.  Specifically, a district court “must state the reasons 
in open court for imposing a particular special condition so 
that the appellate court is not left to speculate about the 
reasons.”  Albertson, 645 F.3d at 200 (quoting Miller, 594 
F.3d at 184).   
 
 A district court’s explanation serves, inter alia, three 
substantive ends.  First, an adequate explanation “promote[s] 
the perception of fair sentencing.”  Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.  As 
the Supreme Court has observed, “[j]udicial decisions are 
reasoned decisions.  Confidence in a judge’s use of reason 
underlies the public’s trust in the judicial institution.  A public 
statement of those reasons helps provide the public with the 
assurance that creates that trust.”  Rita, 551 U.S. at 356; see 
also United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 572 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(en banc).  Second, an adequate explanation is necessary for 
our Court to conduct “meaningful appellate review” for 
substantive reasonableness.  Gall, 552 U.S. at 50; see also 
United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Third, “procedural requirements,” including an adequate 
explanation, “exist to guide the [district court’s] exercise of 
discretion.”  Merced, 603 F.3d at 215 (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted).  A district court’s procedural error may 
lead to a substantively unreasonable sentence.  Id.; see also 
United States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530, 553 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 
C 
 
 This Court has not yet addressed the parameters of an 
adequate explanation under Section 5D1.1(c).  We now hold 
that, as with special conditions of supervised release, a district 
court must “explain and justify” the imposition of supervised 
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release on a deportable immigrant.  Murray, 692 F.3d at 281.  
It “must state the reasons in open court for imposing a [term 
of supervised release on a deportable immigrant] so that the 
appellate court is not left to speculate about the reasons.”  
Albertson, 645 F.3d at 200 (citation omitted).  This 
explanation “should directly address” the presumption against 
imposing supervised release “and provide the court’s 
reasoning for taking a different course of action in the case 
before it.”  United States v. Solano-Rosales, 781 F.3d 345, 
353-54 (6th Cir. 2015).  The court, however, need not “cite 
the guidelines section,” but rather should “acknowledge and 
address” its substance.  Id. at 354. 
 
 In adopting this approach to Section 5D1.1(c), we 
follow the recent decision of the Sixth Circuit in Solano-
Rosales.  We recognize, as did that Court, id. at 354 n.1, that 
other Circuits have stopped short of requiring a district court 
to refer explicitly to the presumption against imposing 
supervised release on a deportable immigrant.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d 416, 424 (4th Cir. 
2015); United States v. Alvarado, 720 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir. 
2013) (per curiam); United States v. Dominguez-Alvarado, 
695 F.3d 324, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2012).  Although this may be 
a “close question,” we agree with the Sixth Circuit that 
“clarity is better served by a direct discussion” of the 
presumption against supervised release and the reasons for 
nevertheless imposing it.  Solano-Rosales, 781 F.3d at 354 
n.1; see also Alvarado, 720 F.3d at 158 (encouraging but not 
requiring district courts to provide an explicit explanation 
“for the sake of clarity”).  
 
 Requiring an explicit explanation under Section 
5D1.1(c) promotes all three of the substantive ends described 
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above.  It assures the public that the decision to impose 
supervised release was a “reasoned decision[]” rather than the 
force of habit.  Rita, 551 U.S. at 356.  Indeed, the Sentencing 
Commission created Section 5D1.1(c) in response to data that 
district courts were imposing supervised release “in more 
than 91 percent of cases in which the defendant is a non-
citizen,” a “high rate” that the Commission deemed 
“unnecessary.”  U.S.S.G. Supp. App. C, Amend. 756, Reason 
for Amendment.  In addition, a district court’s adequate 
explanation will allow us to conduct “meaningful” 
substantive review of Section 5D1.1(c) cases (or render those 
appeals unnecessary).  Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.  Relatedly, 
providing an explanation under Section 5D1.1(c) will “guide” 
a district court to impose supervised release on a deportable 
immigrant only when doing so is substantively reasonable.  
Merced, 603 F.3d at 215.   
 
 As a practical matter, we reiterate that the procedure 
we adopt today is already required in the supervised release 
context.  It is what we require when a district court imposes 
special conditions of supervised release.  Paladino, 769 F.3d 
at 203 n.6; Murray, 692 F.3d at 283; Albertson, 645 F.3d at 
200; Miller, 594 F.3d at 184; Loy, 191 F.3d at 371.  As 
explained above, it should “state the reasons in open court for 
imposing a particular special condition.” Albertson, 645 F.3d 
at 200 (quoting Miller, 594 F.3d at 184).  Given this well-
established principle, a sentencing court will have no practical 
difficulty providing reasons under Section 5D1.1(c).  
 
D 
 
 Azcona-Polanco failed to object in the District Court 
to the imposition of a term of supervised release.  As such, we 
 12 
 
review for plain error his claim that it committed a procedural 
error by sentencing him to a term of supervised release 
without an adequate explanation under Section 5D1.1(c).  As 
did the Sixth Circuit in Solano-Rosales, we will assume 
arguendo that there was a clear or obvious error—an issue we 
need not decide—because any error did not affect Azcona-
Polanco’s substantial rights.  See Solano-Rosales, 781 F.3d at 
354.  Under Section 5D1.1(c), a district court is permitted to 
impose a term of supervised release on a deportable 
immigrant “if the court determines it would provide an added 
measure of deterrence and protection based on the facts and 
circumstances of a particular case.”  U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c), 
cmt. n.5.  In Azcona-Polanco’s case, any supposed deficiency 
in the explanation would not have affected his substantial 
rights given all of the facts cited by the District Court, e.g., 
his serious criminal history; that he previously defied an order 
of removal; that he was ordered removed a second time; that 
after being deported he illegally reentered the United States; 
and that he purchased false identification and assumed an 
alias to remain in the United States illegally.  Thus we will 
affirm the term of supervised release entered by the District 
Court.3   
 
IV 
 
 Azcona-Polanco also challenges as substantively 
unreasonable the District Court’s sentence of imprisonment.  
This argument fails.  The Court sentenced Azcona-Polanco to 
                                              
 3  To the extent Azcona-Polanco’s brief could be 
construed to raise a claim of substantive error with regard to 
the supervised release portion of his sentence, we would 
affirm for the same reasons. 
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41 months’ incarceration—the bottom of the Guideline range.  
As explained above, it considered Azcona-Polanco’s history 
of drug trafficking; that he was twice ordered removed from 
the United States; the nature of the current offense; and his 
use of an illegally-purchased birth certificate and Social 
Security card.  The District Court conducted “the type of 
individualized assessment that Gall demands, and to which 
we must defer.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 575.   
 
V 
 
 The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.  
